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COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE: WHAT IT IS
AND HOW TO PROVE IT
"Marriage" may be defined as a civil status of one man and
one woman capable of contracting, united by contract and
mutual consent for life, for the discharge, to each other and to
the community, of the duties legally incumbent on those,
whose associations are founded on the distinction of sex. ! A
common-law marriage is a civil contract and, in the absence of
special statutory requirements, is completely consummated
per verba praesenti, even though not followed by cohabita-
tion.2
Common-law marriages are recognized in eighteen states.3
South Carolina is one of those states which recognizes them.4
Generally, the question of the validity of a common-law mar-
riage comes into focus in settlements of decedents' estates,
legitimacy of children situations, Workmen's Compensation
cases, cases involving the wife's dower rights, bigamy pro-
ceedings, and Wrohgful Death cases. The law of common-law
marriage, as laid down by the case decisions in South Caro-
lina, is not replete. In this note wherever possible the law ap-
plicable to South Carolina has been cited; however, where no
South Carolina law covering the point could be found, the
law from other jurisdictions which recognize the common-law
marriage is cited.
CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE.
The law of marriage in this country traces its origin back
to the ancient canon law, which consisted of the decrees of
the various Popes, was the basis of the matrimonial law in
England, and has been recognized there ever since the estab-
lishment of Christianity.5
In view of the importance of marriage as a social institu-
tion and the benefits accruing therefrom, it is favored by pub-
1. 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 1 (1948).
2. McGrecry v. Davis, 44 S. C. 195, 22 S. E. 178 (1893).
3. 'K aER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 20 (3d ed. 1946). Alabama,
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan,
Mississippi, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, and Texas.
4. CODE OF LAWS OF SouTH CAROLINA § 20-3 (1952). See also § 20-31
(marriage without a license); Fryer v. Fryer, Rich. Eq. Gas. 85 (S. C.
1832); Tedder v. Tedder, 108 S. C. 271; 94 S. E. 19 (1914), 2 A.L.R.
438 (1919).
5. 13 AM. JuR. Marriage § 2 (1941).
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lic policy and the law.0 It follows that a marriage will, if pos-
sible, be upheld as valid7 and that its validity will be presumed
unless disproved.8 A statute will not be construed to make a
marriage void unless the legislative intent to such effect is
clear and unequivocal.9
Ordinarily the status of marriage continues during the joint
lives of the parties or until divorce or annulment. 10 This is
true of a common-law marriage..'
The general rule in this country is that a common-law mar-
riage, where its validity is recognized, carries with it the same
rights and incidents as a ceremonial marriage. 2 In England,
however, by the ancient common law, a common-law mar-
riage, although binding and indissoluble, would not entitle the
parties to all those legal privileges they would enjoy if mar-
ried according to the form required by statute or eccles-
iastical law.' s The ecclesiastical courts had exclusive jurisdic-
tion to determine the question of the legality of a marriage,
and held that the wife of a common-law marriage was not en-
titled to dower and that the children of the marriage were
illegitimate. 14
REQUISITES OF A COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE
An agreement or consent to become husband and wife im-
mediately at the time of the agreement is necessary to a com-
mon-law marriage. This is known as a marriage per verba de
praesenti.15
It has frequently been said that mutual promises to marry
in the future, followed by sexual intercourse, constitute a
common-law marriage, that consent per verba de futuro cum
copula is sufficient.' 6 This apparently was the rule of the
canon law and was, it seems, applied by the ecclesiastical
courts in England prior to the Marriage Act of 1753.' 7 But
6. Sanders v. Sanders, 52 Ariz. 156, 79 P. 2d 523 (1938).
7. Tarleton v. Thompson, 125 S. C. 182, 118 S. E. 421 (1922).
8. Tyson v. Weatherly, 214 S. C. 306, 52 S. E. 2d 410 (1949).
9. Woodward v. Blake, 38 N. D. 38, 164 N. W. 156 (1917).
10. Smith v. Fuller, 138 Iowa 91, 115 N. W. 912 (1908).
11. Catlett v. Chestnut, 107 Fla. 498, 146 So. 241 (1933).
12. Lavery v. Hutchinson, 249 Ill. 86, 94 N. E. 6 (1911) ; 55 C. J. S.
Marriage § 6 (1948).
13. Newberry v. Brunswick, 2 Vt. 151, 19 Am. Dec. 703 (1829),
wherein Blackstone's Conmnentaries is quoted.
14. Newberry v. Brunswick, supra. See -lso Stringfellow v. Scott,
Rich. Eq. Cas. 109, 111 (S. C. 1832).
15. Meister v. Moore, 96 U. S. 76 (1877).
16. 2 KENT. Coim. 87 (12th ed. 1896).
17. DOEZE,, Common Law Marriage (2d ed. 1920).
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this writer cannot find a United States decision holding such
a marriage valid. Indeed, if it were, there could be no such
thing as seduction under promise of marriage, unless by a
man who was already married or otherwise legally incapable
of marriage, for the intercourse would make the parties man
and wife.'8 The American rule is that a mere agreement to
marry in the future, though followed by cohabitation, is not
a marriage, unless such cohabitation is intended and under-
stood by the parties as a consummation of the marriage, and a
converting of the executory agreement into a present actual
marriage. 19 If the cohabitation is not in consummation of the
agreement, but is commenced in reliance upon a mere promise
or agreement to marry in the future, a marriage per verba de
futuro is not established.20 To the extent, then, of refusing to
recognize a marriage as arising out of consent per verbs de
futuro cum copula, our American common law of marriage
probably differs from the common law of England prior to its
Marriage Act.
A marriage per verba de praesenti may be valid, though no
express words are used. All that is necessary is that the
parties shall intend to marry, and that their intention shall
appear either by their words, or by their conduct.21
As the law stands, a valid marriage, to all intents and
purposes, is established by proof of an actual contract
per verba de praesenti between persons of opposite sexes,
capable of contracting, to take each other for husband
and wife, especially where the contract is followed by co-
habitation. No solemnization or other formality, apart
from the agreement itself, is necessary.22
It is not essential that the contract be entered into before wit-
nesses. 23 The agreement being the essential element in these
marriages, it may, like any other agreement, be proved by
words or by conduct, 24 and by testimony of the parties them-
selveS2 5 or by the testimony of third parties. 26
18. Fryer v. Fryer, Rich. Eq. Cas. 85 (S. C. 1832).
19. Fryer v. Fryer, supra; 55 C. J. S. Marriage § 19 (1948).
20. Hill v. State, 41 Ga. 484 (1871).
21. Fryer v. Fryer, supra note 18; Rodgers v. Heron, 226 S. C. 317,
85 S. E. 2d 104 (1954).
22. Van Tuyl v. Van Tuyl, 57 Barb. 237 (N. Y. 1869).
23. Davis v. Stoaffer, 132 Mo. App. 555, 112 S. W. 282 (1908).
24. Fryer v. Fryer, Rich. Eq. Cas. 85 (S.C. 1832).
25. Tarleton v. Thompson, 125 S. C. 182, 118 S. E. 421 (1922).
26. Fryer v. Fryer, supra note 24.
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When the consent to marry is manifested by words de
praesenti, a present assumption of the marriage status is
necessary. 2r That is, the parties must intend, then and there,
immediately to become husband and wife. The marriage must
be complete at the time of the agreement and not be left to
the future. It is not sufficient to agree to present cohabita-
tion,28 and a future regular marriage when more conven-
ient,29 or when a husband or wife shall die, or when a license
can be obtained, or a ceremony can be performed ;30 but there
must be a present marriage by agreement.31 The rule that a
present assumption of the marriage status is necessary to con-
stitute a valid common-law marriage does not, according to
the weight of judicial authority, mean that cohabitation as
husband and wife must follow the agreement before the mar-
riage is perfect.3 2 Consensus non concubitus facit matrimon-
ium is the usual expression. It is the consent and not the co-
habitation which constitutes the marriage.33 It must be ad-
mitted, however, that in most of the cases where such expres-
sions are found, there was, in fact, cohabitation, 34 and in only
a few cases have marriages by consent, and without cohabita-
tion, been actually involved and upheld.35 There are, however,
some jurisdictions in which marital cohabitation has actually
been held to be a necessary element of a common-law mar-
riage; the position apparently being that the cohabitation
must be, not merely one or more acts of sexual intercourse, but
27. Fryer v. Fryer, supra note 24.
28. Tedder v. Tedder, 108 S. C. 271, 93 S. E. 19 (1914). "Cohabi-
tation, as applied to common-law marriage, means to live or dwell to-
gether, to have the same habitation, so that where one lives and dwells
there does the other live and dwell also."
29. Fryer v. Fryer, Rich. Eq. Cas. 85 (S. C. 1832).
30. Fryer v. Fryer, supra note 29. R. and B. agreed to get married,
and friends arranged an entertainment for the occasion. Unable to find
a justice, it was agreed that they should pretend to the couple's com-
pany, including the girl's mother, that they were married, and that they
would actually get married later. They informed their company as
agreed, cohabited together for several years, but there was no proof
of any actual marriage, though it was supposed by many that they were
married. The alleged husband stated on one occasion that he had no
wife. After the couple ceased to live together the woman married F., and
B. threatened F.'s life for taking his wife, but did nothing more about
it. It was held that R. was not the wife of B., and her marriage to F.
was legal.
31. Ex parte Blizzard, 185 S. C. 131, 193 S. E. 633 (1937).
32. Rutledge v. Tunns, 69 S. C. 400, 48 S. E. 297 (1903).
33. Hulett v. Carey, 66 Minn. 327, 69 N. W. 31 (1896).
34. Gregby v. Reib, 105 Tex. 599, 153 S. W. 1124 (1913).
35. United States v. Simpson, 4 Utah 227, 7 Pac. 257 (1885); 32
HARV. L. REv. 473 (1919); 3 MINN. L. Ruv. 426 (1913).
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marital cohabitation professedly and openly as man and
wife.3
6
As a general rule, an infant is not permitted to contract in
marriage until he or she has attained the age of legal consent.
At common law the age of consent in the case of males is four-
teen years,37 and in the case of females twelve years,38 and,
while in some jurisdictions, the common-law ages have been
retained,3 9 in a majority of jurisdictions they have been in-
creased by statute.
40
At common law, the attempt of an infant under seven years
of age to contract in marriage is nugatory and without legal
significance,41 but the marriage of an infant over seven years
of age, but below the age of legal consent, is not absolutely
void, but is a voidable, or an imperfect, or inchoate mar-
riage.42
Where the marriage is voidable, only a party to the mar-
riage may avoid it, 4 and, where only one of the parties is un-
der the age of consent at the time of the marriage, the other
may not avoid the marriage on such ground.44 Marriages
which are voidable because one or both of the parties were be-
low the age of consent at the time of the marriage are valid
and binding until disaffirmed 45 or until annulled by a judi-
cial decree.
4 6
Where a party to the voidable marriage contracted within
the nonage reaches the age of consent, he or she may elect to
ratify or repudiate the contract, but, having elected to
affirm, he or she may not thereafter disaffirm.47 Likewise,
where a party to a voidable marriage fails to exercise the
option to avoid during his or her life and dies without repu-
diating the marriage by proper proceedings, the legalitiy of
the marriage cannot thereafter be attacked.
1 a
36. State of Maryland v. Baldwin, 112 U. S. 490 (1884); Herd v.
Herd, 194 Ala. 613, 69 So. 885 (1915); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 2 Dana 102,
26 Am. Dec. 437 (Ky. 1833).
37. State v. Ward, 204 S. C. 210, 28 S. E. 2d 785 (1944).
38. Ibid.
39. State v. Ward, supra note 37.
40. Eskew v. Eskew, 198 Ga. 513, 34 S. E. 2d 697 (1945).
41. Hitchens v. Hitchens, 47 F. Supp. 73 (D. C. Cir. 1942).
42. State v. Sellers, 140 S. C. 66, 134 S. E. 873 (1923).
43. Peefer v. State, 42 Ohio App. 276,182 N. E. 117 (1931).
44. Ibid.
45. Walls v. State, 32 Ark. 565 (1877).
46. Kibler v. Kibler, 180 Ark. 1152, 23 S. W. 2d 867 (1930). See
elso, CoDa- OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 20-43 (1952).
47. Kibler v. Kibler, supra note 46.
47a Bennett v. Bennett, 195 S. C. 1, 10 S. E. 2d 23 (1939). [involv-
ing incest.]
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PRESUMPTIONS
In General
There is no presumption that persons are married.48 How-
ever, it is a fundamental maxim of our law that where a man
and woman are living together as husband and wife, mar-
riage should always be presumed. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio.49 In other words, marriage is presumed from co-
habitation. The burden of proving a marriage rests on the
party who asserts it,"° particularly where a common-law mar-
riage is asserted."' And the proof, must be a preponderance of
the evidence.
52
As to Validity of Marriage
It is one of the strongest presumptions of the law, grounded
in public policy favoring and presuming morality, marriage,
and legitimacy, that a marriage, once being shown, is pre-
sumed to be legal and valid. 53 The presumption of validity
applies not only to ceremonial marriages but also to common-
law marriages.
The strength of the presumption increases with lapse of
time, acknowledgments by the parties to the marriage, and
the birth of children ;54 and the fact that the legitimacy of a
child may be involved is a factor in sustaining the validity of
the marriage. 5
In accordance with the rule that a marriage will be pre-
sumed to be valid, where a marriage in due form is proved,
all the prerequisites to its validity will be presumed, in the
absence of countervailing evidence. 50 Thus the capacity of the
parties will be presumed, as will also their consent.
In South Carolina there is a presumption against the mar-
riage involving a white man and a Negro woman, or a Negro
48. Judd v. Skidmore, 33 Minn. 140, 22 N. W. 183 (1885).
49. Hilton v. Raylance, 25 Utah 129, 69 Pac. 660 (1902).
50. Ex parte Blizzard, 185 S. C. 131, 193 S. E. 633 (1937).
51. Ibid.
52. Ex parte Blizzard, supra note 50.
53. Tarleton v. Thompson, 125 S. C. 182, 118 S. E. 421 (1922).
54. Id. at 186. In this case the Court said: "The presumption is in
favor of a marriage; ... that children born in wedlock axe legitimate."
Evidence that part of deceased husband's penis had been removed by
an operation was held not to overcome the presumption that children
born in wedlock were legitimate, in view of evidence that they looked
like him, and that he was fond of them, and conflicting evidence as to
whether he could have sexual intercourse.
55. Pooler v. Smith, 73 S. C. 102, 52 S. E. 967 (1904).
56. Reed v. Reed, 202 Ga. 508, 43 S. E. 2d 539 (1947).
[Vol. 12
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man and a white woman.5 7 Intermarriage is prohibited by
statute in South Carolina.
58
From Cohabitation and Reputation
Unless a marriage between the parties is prohibited by
law,5 9 the fact that a man and woman have openly cohabited
as husband and wife for a considerable length of time, hold-
ing each other out and recognizing and treating each other
as such by declarations, admissions, or conduct, and are ac-
cordingly generally reputed to be such among their relatives
and acquaintances, and those who come in contact with them,
may give rise to a presumption that they had previously en-
tered into an actual marriage, although there is no documen-
tary evidence thereof or direct testimony to that effect.60
Neither reputation without cohabitation 6 nor cohabitation
without reputation6(2 will give rise to the presumption of mar-
riage, although it has also been held without qualification
that a presumption of marriage may arise from reputation"
or from cohabitation. 64
When it is sought to raise a presumption from cohabita-
tion and reputation, the cohabitation must have been ap-
parently matrimonial, 65 and the parties must have recognized
and treated each other as husband and wife, holding each
other out as such, so as to create the reputation that they are
married. 66 Where, also, it is sought to raise a presumption of
marriage from reputation, it must be general and not divided,
and contemporaneous with the cohabitation, not subsequent to
its termination.6 7
By the statement that proof of reputation must be single
and not divided, the courts have uniformly meant that a repu-
tation must reflect the common opinion of the community and
57. Tedder v. Tedder, 108 S. C. 271, 94 S. E. 19 (1914).
58. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 20-7 (1952).
59. Ibid.
60. Fryer v. Fryer, Rich. Eq. Cas. 99 (S. G. 1832); James v. Mickey,
26 S. 0. 273, 2 S. E. 130 (1886).
61. 38 C. J. Marriage § 98 (1925). "Reputation and cohabitation at
best are only presumptive proofs, and where either of these grounds
fail, the courts should not allow the presumption of marriage to be built
upon the other."
62. MeArthur v. Hall, 169 S. W. 2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
63. Griffith v. Lunney, 300 Ky. 66, 187 S. W. 24 431 (1945).
64. Succession of Marinoni, 183 La. 776, 164 So. 797 (1935).
65. Fitzpatrick v. Miller, 129 Pa. Super. 324, 196 Atl. 83 (1937).
66. Fryer v. Fryer, Rich. Eq. Gas. 85 (S. C. 1832).
67. Eldred v. Eldred, 97 Va. 606, 34 S. E. 477 (1899). [Virginia does
not recognize common-law marriage today.]
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not the differing opinions of the neighbors.0 8 This is in ac-
cord with the majority view.69 "A divided reputation is no
reputation at all," for if the individual opinions differ there is
no general reputation. 0
From Records or Lack of Records
In an action by the children of the deceased, claiming to be
heirs at law of decedent for the partition of a tract of land, the
plaintiffs alleging that they and the defendants were tenants
in common, the defendants alleging that the plaintiffs were
illegitimate when the plaintiffs offered a certificate show-
ing that deceased parents were lawfully married, the parties
having previously stipulated that the marriage, if valid, was
a common-law marriage, the court refusing admittance into
evidence of the certificate said:
... it was not shown that the minister who furnished the
certificate was not living. If still alive he could have been
examined as to the fact of the marriage, or another cer-
tificate, if admissible, could have been procured. If dead,
the record of the marriage, if he was required to keep a
record of the same, could have been obtained. If not
bound to keep a record of same, his certificate, whether
he was alive or dead, would have been merely the state-
ment of a private person and would be rejected.7'1
Since common-law marriages require no records, there can be
no presumption arising as to their validity from a certificate
sought to be put into evidence. And if admitted into evidence
the parties named therein must be identified,7 2 and the cer-
tificate will be subject to the requirements for admitting any
other document into evidence.'3
From Acts, Declarations, and Admissions of the Parties
A presumption of marriage may arise from the declara-
tions, admissions and conduct of the parties; and a valid mar-
riage may be inferred from circumstances accruing after the
time of any possible ceremony and from scanty facts.74 It has
been said that:
68. 4 WIGMORE, EVImENCE § 603 (2d ed. 1923).
69. Eldred v. Eldred, supra note 67.
70. In re Boyington's Estate, 157 Iowa 467, 137 N. W. 949 (1912).
71. Frederick v. Culler, 118 S. C. 102, 190 S. E. 889 (1921).
72. Ibid.
73. 1 GREENLAF, EVMENCE § 498 (16th ed. 1899).
74. Application of Durkin, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 354 (1948).
[Vol. 12
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If acknowledgment of marriage and cohabitation are es-
tablished, a presumption of marriage is raised.7 5
It has also been said that such presumption will arise pro-
vided the parties' "behavior" be consistent with the "status
alleged."
7 6
As to Foreign Mrrriage
In the absence of proof to the contrary, the marriage laws
of another state or country are presumed to be the same as
the laws obtaining in the forum ;77 and there is no presump-
tion that the marriage laws of another state or country are
different from the laws obtaining in the forum.
7 8
In determining what law governs a common-law mar-
riage, the court will presume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that it was contracted in the state wherein the acts"
occurred which are relied on as establishing the marriage.
As to Conflicting Marriages
In the case of conflicting marriages of the same spouse, the
presumption of validity operates in favor of the second mar-
riage7 9 Moreover, even where a valid first marriage has beent
established, it may be presumed in favor of the second mar-
riage that at the time thereof the first marriage had been,
dissolved,8 0 so as to cast the burden of adducing evidence to.
the contrary on the party attacking the second marriage, even
though he is thereby required to prove a negative.8 1
The presumption of the validity of the last marriage has
been held to be the strongest presumption known to the law,.
and in the absence of additional facts or circumstances it must
prevail over all conflicting presumptions, such as presump-
tions as to the law obtaining in other states and presumptions.
as to the validity or continuance of a prior marriage.8 2
As to Relations Once Shown to Exist
The fact that a marriage exists at a certain time raises no-
presumption of its prior existence.8 3 However, if the mbr--
riage relation is shown once to exist it will be presumed to.
75. Ibid.
76. Lockett v. Adams, 212 Ark. 899, 208 S. W. 2d 438 (1948).
77. Bell v. Southern Casualty Co., 267 S. W. 531 (Tez. Civ. Ajp..
1925).
78. Scheper v. Scheper, 125 S. C. 89, 118 S. E. 178 (1923).
79. Hallums v. Hallums, 74 S. C. 407, 54 S. E. 613 (1905).
80. Scheper v. Scheper, supra note 78.
81. Reed v. Reed, 202 Ga. 508, 43 S. E. 2d 539 (1947).
82. Roberts v. Roberts, 124 Fla. 116, 167 So. 808 (1936).
83. Reavis v. Gardner, 6 Cal. Unrep. Cas. 477, 60 Pac. 964 (1900).
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continue in the absence of evidence of its dissolution by death
or divorce.8 4
If intercourse between the parties was illicit in its in-
ception because of their failure or disability to enter into a
marriage by ceremony or by agreement, it is presumed to
continue so;85 and the mere fact that the parties continued to
cohabit does not give rise to a presumption of marriage.8 6
The presumption that the relation once shown to exist will
continue applies where a prior marriage is shown to have been
in existence at the time of a second marriage.
8 7
From Absence for Seven Years
* In the case of In re Duncan's Estate,88 evidence that a
woman had received no information concerning the existence
of her first husband for more than seven years prior to her
second marriage was held to establish a presumption of death.
It seems that in this case the Court is referring to the pre-
sumption of death arising from a seven years' absence rather
than a presumption of death arising from the fact of a sec-
ond marriage.
These Presumptions Are All Rebuttable
The presumptions of marriage, as discussed hereinbefore,
are not conclusive, but are open to rebuttal; s9 and if it ap-
pears that there was in fact no marriage between the parties
either by ceremony or by informal contract the presumptions
are dispelled.90 So, for example, the presumption in favor of
the validity of the second marriage of two conflicting mar-
riages may be rebutted by evidence of a valid prior marriage
of one of the parties.91 The presumption of continuance of an
illicit intercourse may also be rebutted, and a matrimonial re-
lationship may be shown, by direct or circumstantial evidence
of a subsequent intermarriage of the parties.
92
I The presumption of marriage arising from marital cohabi-
tation and repute may be rebutted by proof that the cohabita-
84. Hardeman v. Hardeman 179 Ga. 4, 175 S. E. 9 (1984).
85. Cave v. Cave, 101 S. C. 4, 85 S. E. 244 (1914).
86. Howell v. Littlefield, 211 S. C. 462, 46 S. E. 2d 47 (1947) ; Ban-
nister v. Bannister, 150 S. C. 411, 148 S. E. 228 (1929); Lemon v.
Lemon, 158 S. C. 71, 155 S. E. 285 (1929).
87. Clark v. Glenn, 249 Ala. 342, 31 So. 2d 507 (1947).
88. 190 S. C. 211, 2 S. E. 2d 388 (1939).
89, Allen v. Hall, 2 Nott & McC. 114 (S. C. 1819).
90. Peacock v. Peacock, 196 Ga. 441, 26 S. E. 2d 608 (1943).
91. Long v. Brown, 186 Okla. 407, 98 P.. 2d 28 (1940).
92. Agnew v. Agnew, 58 S. D. 164, 235 N. W. 644 (1931).
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tion was in its inception illicit and nonmaterial,98 as where it
is proved that at its commencement either party had a prior
spouse living and undivorced or was otherwise incapacitated
to contract in marriage,94 or that he or she had previously co-
habited with another in such a manner as to give rise to a
presumption of marriage.95 Moreover, if, during the cohabita-
tion with one woman, the man cohabits also with another
woman, no presumption of a marriage with either arises.96
This presumption may likewise be rebutted by proof that the
parties to the cohabitation finally separated without just
cause and that one or both afterward entered into a marriage
with another or afterward cohabited with another as a
spouse.9 7
It has generally been held that the presumptions are also
dispelled by reason of the disparity of the parties in race or
color.98
In order to overcome the presumption of marriage, the evi-
dence must be, in some jurisdictions, "cogent and satisfac-
tory."9 9 In South Carolina it is stated that the evidence must
be "clear and convincing."' 00 However, if sufficient evidence
is not introduced to rebut the presumptions then the contro-
versy is settled in favor of the presumptions.loa
CONCLUSION
It would appear that courts are following a definite trend
to curtail common-law marriages.' 0 ' Whether or not common-
law marriages are in the social interest seems to have oc-
casioned little dispute. Eminent authorities condemn this
practice as a "custom which legalizes and virtually invites
impulsive, impure and secret unions."' 02 Logical reasons in
support of this disfavor are scarce. It has been asserted that
the institution furthers clandestine relations. 103 This ignores
93. Cave v. Cave, 101 S. C. 40, 85 S. E. 244 (1914).
94. Ex parte Blizzard, 185 S. C. 131, 193 S. E. 633 (1937).
95. 38 C. J. Marriage § 111 (1925).
96. Fryer v. Fryer, Rich. Eq. Cas. 85 (S. C. 1832).
97. Fryer v. Fryer, supra note 96.
98. Tedder v. Tedder, 108 S. C. 271, 84 S. E. 19 (1914).
99. In re Foels' Estate, 146 Misc. 428, 263 N. Y. Supp. 327 (1933).
100. Hallums v. Hallums, 74 S. C. 407, 54 S. E. 613 (1905).
10Oa. MCKELVE , EvDENCE § 36 (2d ed. 1907).
101. KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DrVORCE § 20 (3rd ed. 1946).
102. HowARD, HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS (2d ed. 1904).
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the fact that the usual method of establishing its existence is
through notoriety and repute. 04
Critics point out that it encourages false claims and pro-
motes fraud on the part of adventuresses seeking to share in
decedents' estates. 0 5 This is in a large measure true of all
oral contracts.100 Public policy does not favor divesting wi-
dows and orphans for fear that a few imposters may abuse
the court system. The remedy lies rather in the direction of
improving the calibre of juries and punishing perjury. 07 As-
sociated with this objection is the plea that common-law mar-
riages foster stale claims and constitute a clog on titles, be-
cause of the possibility that a widow may appear who was un-
known to creditors and friends. But a very small amount of
investigation will usually reveal whether a man has a wife.
The property interests involved are usually titles to realty
into which an exhaustive search is commonly made. The tirend
has widely been to curtail dower; 0 this eliminates the most
frequent clog.
Finally, common-law marriages are said to i mpair the ef-
feet of statutes aimed at preventing certain types of nmar-
riages100 Even assuming that justices of the peace and license
clerks were universally conscientious inquirers into the age
and capacities of the parties appearing before then, in face
of the temptation of the fee, the law as it stands today still
does not often prevent a meretricious relationship between
the parties denied a license. Moreover, a couple prohibited by
statute from marrying, who undertake to marry by mutual
consent, do not defeat the statute. Their marriage is void or
voidable, according to the nature of the disability, as it would
have been if they had obtained a license through misrepresen-
tation. 10
104. Fryer v. Fryer, Rich. Eq. Cas. 99 (S. C. 1832). See also, Hulett
v. Carey 66 Minn. 327, 69 N. W. 31 (1896), wherein it is stated that
common-law marriages can be secret when their existence is established
by direct testimony of mutual assent to be husband and wife. But seg
which find a marital and not meretricious relationship in a clandestine
affair are scarce.
105. 3 BROOKLYN L. Ray. 155 (1933). This reason has been given as
the moving force behind New York's abandonment of common-law
marriages.
106. 2 U. CIN. L. REV. 113 (1928). The majorio o eases involving
common-law marriages arise in relation to decedent's estates rather than
in maintenance, alimony, or bigamy proceedings.
107. 245 CRib. L. REv. (N. Y.) 901 (1928).
108. 19 GEo. L. J. 306 (1931).
109. 20 MIcH. L. Rav. 244 (1921).
110. Matter of Wright, 110 31isc. 480, 180 X. Y. SupP. 625 (1920).
It is obvious, for instance, that a common-l4aw marriage between father
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The desirability of abolishing common-law marriage is open
to serious question. The legitimacy of children and the sanc-
tioning of the status of the bona fide widow are important so-
cial factors."' The real bias against common-law marriage
seems based on the feeling that there is something unholy and
impure about them. This can probably be traced to the influ-
ence of the church on our marital institutions." 2 The Church
Fathers for the most part failed to understand the spiritual
nature of marriage - joys of comradeship, mutual under-
standing and sympathy. As a reaction from Roman licentious-
ness they swung to the concept of marriage as a sacrament
and sex as a sin. In later times, this conception was congenial
to an industrial society whose standards of thrift and indus-
try left little time for the less concentrated aspects of sex."1
3
Since World War I, the economic and religious bonds involved
have weakened, 114 and the resulting emphasis on comradeship
in marriage" 5 has tended to reduce the demands for the cere-
monial. Courts and legislatures which set themselves against
this tendency evince the customary "cultural lag."" 6 The Eng-
lish law has sought again and again to control sexual morality
for the English peoples; the number of the attempts is of
itself an indication of the difficulties and the failures.
1"
HOLLAND SMITH.
and daughter would be void; nor would the written consent of a girl
of eight years to marry an adult be a defense to the charge of statu-
tory rape.
111. 1 BISHOP, MARRIAGE, DIvoRE, AND SEPARATION, §§ 385-389
(1891).
112. Ibid.
113. PARRINGTON, COLONIAL MIND p. 133 (2d ed. 1954).
114. REPORT OF PRESIDENT HOOVER'S COMMITTEE ON SOcIAL TRENDS
p. 153 (1933).
115. OGBURN AND TIBBETS, THE FAMILY p. 233 (1st ed. 1934).
116. BRNEST, CHANGING LAWs AND CHANGING ATTITUDES § 21 (2d ed.
1934).
117. MAY, SOCIAL CONTROL OF SEX EXPRESSIONS p. 9 (1st ed. 1929).
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